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According to the Washington Consensus, developing countries' growth would benefit from a reduction
in tariffs and other barriers to trade. But a backlash against this view now suggests that trade policies
have little or no impact on growth. If "getting policies right" is wrong or infeasible, this leaves only
the more tenuous objective of "getting institutions right" (Easterly 2005, Rodrik 2006). However, the
empirical basis for judging recent trade reforms is weak. Econometrics are mostly ad hoc; results are
typically not judged against models; trade policies are poorly measured (or not measured at all, as
when trade volumes are spuriously used); and the most influential studies in the literature are based
on pre-1990 experience (which predates the "Great Liberalization" in developing countries which
followed the GATT Uruguay Round). We address all of these concerns -- by using a model-based
analysis which highlights tariffs on capital and intermediate goods; by compiling new disaggregated
tariff measures to empirically test the model; and by employing a treatment-and-control empirical
analysis of pre- versus post-1990 performance of liberalizing and nonliberalizing countries. We find
evidence that a specific treatment, liberalizing tariffs on imported capital and intermediate goods, did
lead to faster GDP growth, and by a margin consistent with theory (about 1 percentage point per annum).
Endogeneity problems are considered and other observations are consistent with the proposed mechanism:
changes to other tariffs, e.g. on consumption goods, though collinear with general tariffs reforms, are
more weakly correlated with growth outcomes; and the treatment and control groups display different
behavior of investment prices and quantities, and capital flows.
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Inter-American Development Bank
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Does trade policy liberalization promote economic growth? The question has been central to 
recent economic policy debates since the dawn of the new era of globalization in the 1990s. Yet 
the opinions of economists, once quite coherent, are now far from unanimous. 
In the 1990s the so-called “Washington Consensus” (WC) promoted openness to trade as an 
essential  policy  reform  to  promote  growth  and  higher  incomes.
1  At  first,  absent  statistical 
evidence, this view garnered support as practitioners looked back on the divergent economic 
fortunes of the fast-growing export-oriented New Industrializing Countries (NICs) of East Asia 
and the sluggish inward-looking economies of Latin America. Subsequently, a barrage of cross-
country  econometric  studies  seemed  to  lend  weight  to  this  view,  including  well  known  and 
widely cited works by Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), and Frankel 
and Romer (1999). It was in this intellectual climate that trade barriers fell in many developing 
countries all over the world in the “Great Liberalization” of the 1990s. 
  A decade later whatever consensus there might have been, appears lost. A recent survey of 
the World Bank’s self-review Learning from Reform by Rodrik (2006) is entitled “Goodbye 
Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion.” The survey notes that some still believe 
that the problem was too little reform, rather than too much; but once one gets past the few hold 
outs (e.g., the IMF), it seems that if there is any sort of new consensus in Washington it is one 
where the focus has shifted from getting policies right (the “policy view”) to getting institutions 
right (the “institutions view”), although the practical implications of that shift are quite unclear 
(Easterly 2005). The one-line abstract on Rodrik’s website sums up the current mood: “The 
Washington Consensus is dead. What will take its place?” 
It would be a mistake to equate trade liberalization with the entire Washington Consensus; 
but, of the ten reforms in the original WC package, trade policy seems to have attracted the most 
attention. Why? On trade policy, the political stakes appear high—protests and riots accompany 
WTO meetings but there is not such violent agitation over other issues in the WC package; and 
no doubt the other elements of the WC are uncontroversial—e.g., nobody is now arguing for 
fiscal indiscipline or insecure property rights. 
In  the  research  arena,  the  openness-growth  linkage  has  also  attracted  a  vast  amount  of 
attention, probably more than any other element of the Washington Consensus. It is also where 
the apparent reversal of sentiment has been most dramatic. Academic research has played no 
small part in this revolution. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) replicated and extended the above 
heavily cited works from the 1990s to assess their robustness—and found them wanting. Theirs 
is now another widely referenced work that lends weight to an increasingly prevalent view that 
trade policies may have very little to do with economic performance.
2 Moreover, in later work by 
                                                 
1 In fairness to Williamson (1990), his WC recommendations were a broad and coherent package of ten reforms, of 
which trade reforms were just a part. We say “so-called” because the term “Washington Consensus” soon took on a 
life of its own. The ten reforms were summarized by Rodrik (2006, 978) as: fiscal discipline; reorientation of public 
expenditures;  tax  reform;  financial  liberalization;  unified  and  competitive  exchange  rates;  trade  liberalization; 
openness to FDI; privatization; deregulation; and secure property rights. 
2 Rodríguez and Rodrik focus on the papers by Sachs and Warner, Frankel and Romer, Edwards and Dollar because 
these papers were most influential in terms of impact. For example, the citation counts as of July 2008 were: Sachs   2 
Easterly, Rodrik and others, institutions have been proposed as the “deeper determinants” that 
have been said to trump other factors such as trade policies (Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Easterly 2005). 
The latest findings might have laid to rest the debate about growth and trade policy, but we 
argue that the jury is still out. As noted by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001), cross-section empirical 
work to date has depended on dubious and noisy data. Confidence intervals were generally large 
and not far from zero. It was therefore relatively easy to find results that would disappear under 
alternative assumptions or with a different set of controls. Of course, imprecision does not mean 
that there is no effect, only that our tests are weak and we have not yet been able to measure 
precisely  enough  to  answer  the  question—and  the  coefficient  estimates  of  skeptics  like 
Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) are just as subject to this critique as those of the earlier literature. 
Thus the tariff-growth literature has reached an apparent impasse. Unclear results meant that 
neither side can really claim victory, so policy debates over the merits of a key element of the 
Washington Consensus are still unresolved. 
As far as trade policy is concerned, if the reports of the death of the Washington Consensus 
might be exaggerated, can we make any further progress? We think so, if only because so much 
time has now passed since the first round of empirical studies. As the academic and policy 
community now judges the Washington Consensus, one troubling aspect of the most cited papers 
in the literature on openness and growth, both pro and con, is that they all base their tests on data 
drawn  from  periods  before  1990:  before  the  Washington  Consensus  had  even  emerged,  and 
before the “Great Liberalization” in trade policy in the 1990s had taken root in most developing 
countries,  following  the  completion  of  the  Uruguay  Round  and  the  rise  of  politics  more 
sympathetic to free markets. This problem affects the datasets in Frankel and Romer (spanning 
1960–85), Edwards (1960–89), Sachs and Warner (1970–89), and Dollar (1970–89), as well as 
all of the robustness checks of these studies in Rodríguez and Rodrik. But now, more than 15 
years after the end date of the last generation of studies, we ought to be in a position to judge the 
effects of the experiment that was the Washington Consensus as it has run from 1990 onwards. 
And we ought to do so using sounder tests and harder data.
3  
In this paper, we do just that—we document the “Great Liberalization” experiment and study 
its correlation with before-and-after growth outcomes in two windows, 1975–89 and 1990–2004. 
For sure, skeptical studies, notably Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) and Easterly (2005), have set a 
higher bar for future empirical work, a bar which we now endeavor to surmount. We agree with 
them  that  the  data  and  the  techniques  used  by  all  sides  in  the  debate  thus  far  have  been 
inadequate in a number ways, most notably: 
                                                 
and Warner 2212; Frankel and Romer 1658; Edwards 901; Dollar 616. Rodríguez and Rodrik had 1367 citations, 
making theirs the dominant paper with the opposing viewpoint. Citation counts from scholar.google.com. 
3 Even within the confines of cross-sectional empirical work the debate has moved on from the works surveyed by 
Rodrik and Rodríguez (2001). More recent papers arguing for a positive effect of trade on growth include Alcalá and 
Ciccone (2004), Noguer and Siscart (2005), and Warner (2003). In turn, the skeptics have made further responses: 
see Rodríguez (2007).   3 
  The data are scant in terms of spatial and temporal coverage; the latter encouraged cross-
section OLS estimation which is plagued by omitted-variable and endogeneity problems; 
  The trade policy measures were subject to measurement error or subjective bias; 
  They  were  often  endogenous  “outcome”  measures  (like  trade  volume)  that  did  not 
correspond to any trade policy measure that was directly controlled by policymakers; 
  They did not correspond to any trade policy measure that would be suggested by theory 
as having a causal impact on growth; 
  They were not robustly correlated with growth outcomes, and appeared to be trumped by 
institutions. 
Hence,  in  this  paper  we  aim  to  confront  all  of  these  issues  and  develop  an  improved 
methodology and dataset for studying the tariff-growth question. We pay attention to theory and 
seek tariff measures that can be disaggregated into consumption, intermediate, and capital goods 
tariffs. Importantly, given concerns about the Sachs-Warner and other binary policy measures, 
we implement tests using both discrete and continuous treatment measures. Finally, we answer 
the right policy question, attend to inference and identification problems, and avoid biases by 
using  the  difference-in-difference  approach.  In  other  words  we  seek  a  treatment-and-control 
partition of countries on the basis of whether they engaged in WC-style trade liberalization, and 
we see whether the liberalizers experienced accelerated growth relative to nonliberalizers. 
Using this “policy experiment” approach we perform growth empirics based on identification 
in the time dimension rather than in cross section. Using similar methods previous authors have 
used a variety of trade openness indicators, some of them subject to the Rodríguez and Rodrik 
critiques, and some of the dating from the pre-WC era. Harrison (1996) studied only the pre-WC 
period using trade liberalization proxies for approximately the 1960s–1980s period, though not 
all were strict policy measures (e.g., trade shares). In some ways, the closest article to ours in 
spirit is by Slaughter (2001), but his focus was also pre-WC, dealing with the EEC, EFTA and 
Kennedy round liberalizations that primarily affected rich countries in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
study by Dollar and Kraay (2004) encompasses developing countries and runs through the 1990s, 
but they identified liberalizers using growth in nominal trade shares, an endogenous variable. As 
Kraay  (2007,  139)  admits,  if  one  is  looking  for  policy  prescriptions,  then  “one  can  always 
object” to findings based on trade volumes rather than trade policies.
4 Turning to recent studies 
using policy measures, Lee, Ricci and Rigobon (2004) find weaker results using continuous 
average  tariff  or  duty  measures  than  with  trade  volumes.  Wacziarg  and  Welch  (2008)  find 
positive results, but they use  the Sachs-Warner  indicator (extended to more recent years), a 
variable that is disliked by skeptics and which includes some non-trade-policy components. 
                                                 
4 Dollar and Kraay (2004) do find that countries that experienced more rapid trade share growth also experienced 
sharper tariff declines. But as Rodrik points out in his October 2000 critique of their paper, “The authors combine a 
policy measure (tariff averages) with an outcome (import/GDP) measure in selecting countries. This is conceptually 
inappropriate, as policy makers do not directly control the level of trade. Saying that ‘participation in world trade is 
good for a country’ is as meaningful as saying that ‘upgrading technological capabilities is good for growth’ (and 
equally helpful to policy makers). The tools at the disposal of governments are tariff and non-tariff barriers, not 
import or export levels.” See http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Rodrik%20on%20Dollar-Kraay.pdf .   4 
Our approach is somewhat different. First, starting from theory we focus attention on input 
tariffs, that is, on capital and intermediate goods. Then we painstakingly collect new and more 
detailed tariff data on consumption, capital, and intermediate goods from primary sources, using 
easy digital sources for recent years, but with recourse to some extremely cumbersome and 
hitherto unused archival sources for the 1980s. Based on a difference-in-difference design we 
then do find a significant correlation between tariff reductions and growth acceleration in the last 
30 years, one that is much stronger for tariffs on capital and intermediate goods than for average 
tariffs. The estimated impacts are large, but not too large: about 1 percentage point per year 
higher growth for liberalizers. But this is reassuring, for two reasons: the impacts are plausible 
and they mesh with the predictions of a simple calibrated model. 
In the next section we develop a basic growth model where trade can play a role and use 
simple calibrations to estimate the plausible magnitude of policy impacts. Drawing on the theory, 
we then confront the need for more detailed tariff data than have been used to date, and describe 
how we collected and collated these data from primary and secondary sources. In the final main 
section, we test the theory using the data by applying statistical methods of the treatment-control 
type  that  avoid  many  of  the  problems  common  to  cross-section  methods.  We  also  address 
endogeneity concerns using new arguments, since standard instruments are of no use in this 
context and changes in trade policy are more strongly correlated with changes in growth rates 
than  changes  in  institutions  or  schooling.  Policy  changes  also  correlate  with  other  changes 
predicted by theory such as capital goods prices, investment levels, and capital inflows. 
1. Theory and Calibration 
Any reasonable model of the relationship between trade protection and growth must be about 
more than the static gains, those resulting from the elimination of allocative inefficiencies (i.e., 
Harberger triangles). In any reasonably calibrated static general-equilibrium model the gains are 
simply far too small to matter in this debate. For example, a much-cited study of the likely 
impacts of the Doha round estimated that the static gains for developing countries of completely 
free trade would amount to just 0.8% of income (Anderson and Martin 2005, Table 3). The 
World Bank (2005) stands behind these estimates. As Rodrik (2006, 976) puts it: 
One of the insights of [the World Bank’s] Learning from Reform is that the conventional package 
of reforms was too obsessed with deadweight-loss triangles and reaping the efficiency gains from 
eliminating them, and did not pay enough attention to stimulating the dynamic forces that lie 
behind  the  growth  process.  Seeking  efficiency  gains  does  not  amount  to  a  growth  strategy. 
Although the report does not quite put it in this way, what I think the authors have in mind is that 
market or government failures that affect accumulation or productivity change are much more 
costly, and hence are more deserving of policy attention, than distortions that simply affect static 
resource allocation. 
So we must move beyond static CGE analysis and look at dynamics using a growth model. But 
for a growth model to be useful here it must include some basis for trade. A realistic and simple 
production system for this purpose is a model of at least two sectors where a developing country   5 
has a comparative disadvantage in producing (some) inputs to the production process, be they 
capital inputs (durable for many periods) or intermediate inputs (nondurable).
5 
An early and clear exposition of this sort of model is that of Mazumdar (1996), which was 
written as a response to Baldwin (1992). The model features consumption and capital goods (but 
not intermediates), and the goods are produced with identical factor shares, so that Hecksher-
Ohlin  and  Stolper-Samuelson  effects  are  absent.  As  a  result,  countries  are  completely 
specialized. This assumption of uniform factor intensities is now commonplace.
6 Using this type 
of model one can explore both transitional dynamics and the steady state, where the dynamics of 
factor accumulation can follow either Solow or Ramsey mechanics.
7 
How  does  trade  policy  enter  these  models?  Tariffs  on  imported  capital  goods  lower  the 
steady-state level of output since the tariffs are a tax that distorts the relative price of capital (De 
Long and Summers 1991; Jones 1994; Taylor 1994, 1998). The developing country, with its 
comparative disadvantage in producing capital goods, will see the price of capital goods fall 
when  trade  is  liberalized.  In  a  neoclassical  model,  this  leads  to  medium-run  growth  effects 
(growth speeds up in the transition to the new steady state) and a long-run level effect (the new 
steady  state  will  have  higher  GDP,  all  else  equal).  We  now  develop  and  calibrate  a 
Solow/Ramsey model of this type, with both traded and nontraded inputs, allowing for the inputs 
to include both capital goods and intermediates.
8 
A Calibrated Model 
We assume a small open “developing” economy (developing here means an importer of capital 
and intermediates; some rich countries fit this description). Output is used for consumption, as a 
nontraded intermediate variety, as a nontraded capital variety, or is exported to obtain imports of 
traded intermediate and capital varieties. Output is made using two factors of production, labor L 
and capital K. The labor endowment is L = 1 fixed; but capital K can be accumulated. 








and the Cobb Douglas form means that spending on intermediates X is equal to 
€ 
σY . Thus GDP, 
or value added, is given by 
€ 
(1−σ)Y . 
Trade is balanced. For simplicity, output is the numeraire, and is exportable with no tax or 
friction and the world (and domestic) price of this good is set to 1, without loss of generality. 
Units are chosen so that world prices of the imported goods are also equal to 1. The imported 
capital goods have a domestic price PI and imported intermediates have a domestic price PX, 
                                                 
5 On North-South trade in capital goods see Eaton and Kortum (2001). 
6 See, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2007). 
7 Mazumdar (1996) examines both the Solow and Ramsey cases. In the first model of Eaton and Kortum (2001), and 
in Hsieh and Klenow (2003), the focus is on either Solow or Ramsey steady states. 
8 For a similar argument in an “AK” model see Lee (1995) or Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999). In these cases, 
the tariff reduction has permanent effects on the growth rate of income, not its level.   6 
where PI = (1 + tI) and PX = (1 + tX) and the tI and tX are ad valorem tariffs. For simplicity we can 
assume that other transport costs are zero (or we assume that 1 is the CIF price) but this does not 
affect the argument. 
With regard to technology assumptions, we will look at two extreme cases in order to check 
the sensitivity of the response of growth to tariffs in this setting. For simplicity we look at cases 
where there is no change in the traded/nontraded margin, although such effects would magnify 
the gains from trade and could form the subject of future research. 
  Case 1. All I and X goods are traded and can be imported. Domestic output can only be 
used for consumption or exported. In this case there is 100% pass through from tariff 
changes to the domestic input prices of I or X. This will lead to a high estimate of the 
impact of tariffs on growth and income, although the impacts would be larger if we 
allowed for gains from changes in the traded/nontraded margin. 
  Case 2. A fraction of the I and X goods are imported varieties and the rest are nontraded 
and have to be produced from domestic output. For simplicity, the traded-nontraded 
goods are combined in Leontief fashion so that there is no change in the marginal good 
(the traded/nontraded boundary is fixed). In this case there is only a limited pass through 
of tariff changes to the domestic price index of I or X goods. This will lead to a low 
estimate of the impact of tariffs on growth and income. 
For  each  case  we  look  at  two  types  of  accumulation  dynamics:  Solow  and  Ramsey.  Our 
simulations begin with the economy at its steady state with tariffs in place. 
The Solow Version 
In  the  Solow  model  spending  on  inputs  is 
€ 
σY = PXX  and  on  investment  is 
€ 
s(1−σ)Y = PII, 
where  s  is  the  exogenous  savings  rate.  Consumption  of  domestic  output  is  the  remainder, 
€ 
(1− s)(1−σ)Y .  






   
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1−α ( ). 
We see immediately that a fall in PX is isomorphic to a rise in total factor productivity (A). This 
is one place where reductions in intermediate tariffs create dynamic gains. 











=δK,   7 
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We now see that a fall in PI is isomorphic to a rise in the savings rate s. This is where reductions 
in capital goods tariffs have the potential to create dynamic gains. We can also see how a fall in 
PX increases the steady state level of capital, through its TFP-like impact on output. 
  How does trade policy affect the prices of capital and intermediate goods? This depends on 
the traded and nontraded shares. In Case 1, with all inputs imported, the tariff cut feeds one-for-
one  directly  into  the  domestic  price.  In  the  more  general  Case  2  this  is  not  true,  and  the 
assumption  of  Leontief  technology  allows  us  to  see  how  far  intermediate  input 
complementarities can amplify these development frictions.
9 
We  assume  aggregate  investment  I  is  a  Leontief  composite  of  traded  goods  T  and 









   
 
   . 
Since domestic output has a price of 1, and can be used as the nontraded investment good, the 
price index for one unit of investment is then 
€ 
(1− β)+ βPI. 
We assume also that aggregate intermediate input is Leontief composite of traded goods 









   
 
   . 
Since domestic output has a price of 1, and can be used as the nontraded intermediate good, the 
price index for one unit of intermediate input is then 
€ 
(1−γ )+γPX. 
The analysis goes through as before except that there is less trade and some home output 
now goes to make the nontraded capital and intermediate goods. Thus, 
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.                      (1) 
For calibration purposes we choose parameters representative of developing countries. We set 
α = 1/3 following Gollin (2002). We assume s = 0.25 and δ = 0.06. Following Jones (2008) we 
set σ = 0.5, so intermediates have a 50% share of output; this is more conservative than the 0.7 
postulated by Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999). In the case of fully traded inputs we set β = 1 
and γ = 1. For the case with some nontraded inputs, we set β = 0.3 and γ = 0.15, which are close 
to the average values in the developing country dataset we use in the empirical analysis later.
10 
The Ramsey Version 
The Ramsey model is identical to the Solow model except that it replaces a fixed savings ratio s 
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The consumption equation is 
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(1− β)+ βPI [ ]
. 
At the steady state 
€ 
r = ρ (where 
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10 To compute these parameters for the average country in our dataset we gather import value data by types of goods 
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.                          (2) 
Some important similarities between the Ramsey equation (2) and the Solow equation (1) for K* 
may be noted. The elasticities of K* with respect to changes in investment and intermediate 
prices  are  the  same.  Thus,  with  respect  to  changes  in  tariffs,  the  long-run  steady  state 
implications of the two models are identical, all else equal. 
What will differ are the transitional dynamics. As is well known, for typical calibrations 
the Ramsey model has a much faster convergence speed than the Solow model, and this is true 
here. Our calibrated Solow model converges at 4% per year to steady state, which is at the high 
end of empirical estimates of convergence speed (see e.g., Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; 
Dowrick and Rogers 2002). Our calibrated Ramsey model converges about twice as fast, at about 
8% per year, a speed rarely seen in empirical work (Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort 1996). 
Simulations 
For the Solow and Ramsey simulations we compute GDP each year and in the final steady state, 
starting from an initial steady state with PI = PX = 1.25 (25% uniform tariffs) and where the 
policy change at time T is to remove these tariffs. These tariff changes are again comparable to 
what we shall see in the data for those countries that pursued liberalization in the Uruguay round. 
Three types of trade liberalization are considered: 
  Eliminate the 25% I tariff and reduce PI to 1 (“I”). 
  Eliminate the 25% X tariff and reduce PX to 1 (“X”). 
  Eliminate the 25% I and X tariffs and reduce both PI and PX to 1 (“XI”). 
Simulations of growth trajectories in the Solow and Ramsey cases without nontraded goods are 
shown in Figure 1. These simulations show, as expected, that the Ramsey results are the same as 
the Solow results apart from the faster convergence speeds. Investment tariff reductions (I) have 
no immediate impact, since they do not raise productivity. But they encourage accumulation. In 
the  long  run  output  rises  by  11.5%.  In  contrast,  intermediate  tariff  reductions  (X)  have  an 
immediate impact, since they raise productivity right away. They also encourage accumulation, 
like any other productivity shock. In the long run output rises by 39.4%. Finally, when both 
tariffs are removed, the effects are compounded and in the long run output rises by 55.6%. 
Translated into average impacts we can compute the medium-term growth acceleration 
effects, which are also shown in Figure 1 for comparison with the empirical results from finite 
samples. We examine growth accelerations over a 15 year period to conform to our empirical 
design. As expected, the Ramsey model generates slightly higher growth impacts in the first 15 
years after a policy change, due to the faster convergence speed. Overall, the simulation suggest 
a  high  estimate  for  the  growth  impact  of  eliminating  a  25%  tariff  would  be  an  extra  2.5 
percentage points of growth per year in this window, or 0.1 percentage points of extra growth per   10 
1% of tariff reduction. We note that a very large share (four fifths) of this effect is felt through 
the impact of cheaper intermediate goods due to the X tariff reduction. 
Simulations for the model with nontraded goods are shown in Figure 2. These simulations 
show much smaller impacts (note the vertical scale change) because by assumption there is no 
pass through from tariff reductions to the prices of nontraded capital and intermediate goods. We 
have set the traded share of capital goods to β = 0.3 and the traded share of intermediate goods to 
γ = 0.15, so we can see that to a first approximation the impacts on the steady-state output level 
of  reductions  in  I  and  X  tariffs  will  be  reduced  by  70%  and  85%  respectively.  In  fact,  for 
investment  tariff  reductions  (I)  output  rises  by  3.7%.  For  intermediate  tariff  reductions  (X) 
output rises by 5.7%. And when both tariffs are removed, output rises by 9.6%. 
The medium-term growth acceleration effects of this model are also shown in Figure 2. 
These effects are about one fifth as big as those seen in table C. Overall, these simulations 
suggest  a  low  estimate  for  the  growth  impact  of  a  25%  tariff  removal  would  be  about  0.5 
percentage points of growth per year in this window, or 0.02% of extra growth per 1% of tariff 
reduction. A large part (2/3) of this effect is felt via the intermediate goods channel. 
Summary: From Theory To Empirics 
The above simulations can guide our interpretation of empirical results. They already put in a 
fresh perspective some of the most-cited work from the trade and growth debate. Static CGE 
models estimating trivial one-shot gains of 1% or less would appear to be too pessimistic, since 
the results fail to take into account the dynamic gains from cheaper capital and intermediate 
inputs. Our low estimate suggests a level effect of 9.6%, an order of magnitude bigger than these 
estimated static gains; and our high estimate of 56% is almost another order of magnitude bigger 
still. These larger gains from trade are far from trivial for those developing countries (most of 
them) which must import key intermediate and capital goods. 
  In our view, the plausible growth and level effects ought to be somewhere between our high 
and low estimates. Although many goods are nontraded, we can think of several factors that are 
not included in our simple model, nor in the empirical work we present below, which could 
cause a higher growth response: the possibility of more aggressive substitution toward cheaper 
inputs (not allowed by our Leontief specification); the fixed traded/nontraded margin (which 
surely moves in reality); and the removal of nontariff barriers (absent in this model but which are 
also removed during trade reforms).
11 
Thus if even our low-end estimate of growth impacts is around an extra 0.5 percentage points 
per year for 15 years, we might take the view that estimates above 0.5 and perhaps up to 1.0–1.5 
percentage points per year might be reasonable given these extra factors. In the empirical work 
that follows we find exactly this kind of impact. 
                                                 
11 Although “obfuscation” may sometimes lead to a rise in NTBs which offset tariff reductions (Kono 2006).   11 
2. Data 
We compiled, and in some cases hand collected, the following data to test the theory. 
Growth rate: The dependent variable is GDP per worker (rgdpch) from the Penn World 
Table (PWT) database (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/; version 6.2). Rates of growth on long periods 
are calculated in continuous fashion, using differences in log levels divided by years elapsed. 
Average Tariffs: Three tariff measures are employed. The first is an average tariff measure, 
for which we use the mean tariff rate from the Economic Freedom in the World (EFW) 2005 
database (http://www.freetheworld.com/; variable: Area 4-A(ii) Data). Data are available every 5 
years from 1970 to 2000, plus annually for 2001, 2002, and 2003, and the sample size grows 
from 77 countries in 1970 to 122 in the year 2000. In our regressions we employ samples of up 
to 75 countries from this database. 
Disaggregated  Tariffs:  Since  theory  makes  an  important  distinction  between  capital, 
intermediate, and consumption tariffs, we go beyond existing measures and compile data on 
disaggregated tariffs. We compiled data on disaggregated Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied 
tariffs for two benchmark eras: “early” or “before” meaning circa 1985 (in practice, between 
1985 and 1993), and “late” or “after” meaning circa 2000 (in practice, between 1999 and 2001). 
Note that these applied tariffs may differ from the ceilings set by the bound rates which are the 
actual object of negotiation in the GATT/WTO process. 
For the late benchmark we rely on pre-compiled tariff data by the UNCTAD’s TRAINS 
(Trade Analysis and Information System). However, for the earliest benchmark, TRAINS only 
covers 23 countries in our sample. Tariff data for 8 European Union countries are based on 
TRAINS complemented with EU Tariff Schedules. For the rest of the sample, 18 countries, we 
had no option but to collect the tariff data by hand, line by line, from national tariff schedules 
from  the  1980s.  Tariff  data  for  all  Latin  American  Countries  comes  from  national  customs 
schedules provided by ALADI. For the rest of the sample we used published national tariff 
schedules  available  at  the  Library  of  Congress  (Washington,  D.C.).  This  was  a  non-trivial 
exercise and for some countries there were many thousands of tariff lines to be collected. 
Finally, unweighted average tariffs were computed for consumption, capital and intermediate 
goods. The use of an unweighted tariff is important to avoid the criticism that is often leveled in 
the literature at import-weighted tariffs, namely that they may understate protection when some 
tariff rates are at or near prohibitive levels (see, e.g., Warner 2003; Rodríguez 2007). 
In  our  regressions  we  employ  samples  of  up  to  47  countries  from  this  more  restricted 
database. Further details of our tariff data are provided in the Appendix. 
Other Controls: In the course of our empirical analysis we add some control variables in the 
growth regressions. We measure institutional quality as legal and property rights according to the 
Economic Freedom in the World 2005 database (Area 2-AB composite score; where 2-A is an 
index of judicial independence (“the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by 
the government or parties in disputes”); and 2-B is an index of impartial courts (“a trusted legal 
framework  exists  for  private  businesses  to  challenge  the  legality  of  government  actions  or   12 
regulation”)). As is common in growth regressions (see Easterly 2005), we can also include a 
measure of human capital, proxied by total years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2000) and a 
catch-up term, initial income per worker (from PWT) to control for transitional dynamics. 
3. Empirics: Design and Implementation 
In this section we present an empirical design which differs from the previous cross-section 
literature, but which is—we think—better suited to the policy question at hand. In this design, we 
consider  post-1990  trade  liberalization  as  a  treatment.  We  implement  the  design  using  two 
different methods. The first method treats openness as a discrete (zero-one) treatment in the spirit 
of Sachs and Warner (1995), and uses a difference-in-difference estimator. The second method 
treats openness as a continuous treatment, following most of the literature, using tariff rates as a 
proxy for openness in a regression in differences. Difference estimators avoid omitted-variable 
problems  that  plague  cross-section  analysis,  at  least  when  the  omitted  regressors  are  time-
invariant country characteristics. But the treatment variable must be exogenous. In a later section 
we consider endogeneity issues and potential instrumental variables. 
Empirical Design and The Great Liberalization 
In the older literature critiqued by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) the dominant question was: do 
liberalized countries grow faster than nonliberalized countries, in a given period, all else equal? 
But this is, we believe, the wrong question. At the very least, it is probably an empirically 
unanswerable  question,  since  ensuring  that  all  the  proper  controls  are  included  is  likely  an 
impossible task. Thus, the results in this literature are fraught with omitted variable bias, and 
their  resulting  fragility,  as  noted  by  Rodríguez  and  Rodrik  (2001),  leaves  little  hope  of  a 
definitive conclusion—save the meager refuge offered by a null hypothesis of no effect. 
In contrast, we think the right question is: does the rate of growth accelerate more in a 
liberalizing (treatment group) country as compared to nonliberalizing (control group) country? 
This way of looking at the question has numerous benefits. It corresponds most closely to the 
policy question being asked by developing country governments before liberalizing, and it also 
corresponds most closely to the Washington Consensus claim that liberalizers would grow faster 
then they would have without liberalization—notwithstanding the fact that many other factors, 
some unobservable, and many unalterable, could still intervene to cause differences in growth 
rates between countries whether they were liberalizing or not. 
This way of looking at the question also leads to a cleaner empirical design, as was noted 
from the start (Harrison 1996). It naturally leads to an estimation of growth rates in differences, 
which  is  immune  from  omitted  variable  bias  arising  from  time-invariant  characteristics;  all 
country-specific fixed effects in the growth equation are swept away by differencing. A naïve 
difference equation with no controls could then be perfectly satisfactory, provided the parallel 
trends assumption is met. More generally, we may have to worry about any variables that change   13 
over time in the growth equation. However, as in the cross section literature, we know that 
endogenous variables should not be included as regressors. The variables to be included should 
be  either  (a)  exogenous  or  (b)  endogenous  and  properly  instrumented.  And  of  course  this 
requirement applies to our treatment variable as much as any other control. 
However, studying trade liberalization as a treatment-control problem also raises the stakes 
empirically. Put simply, if an experimental design is going to work then there has to be some sort 
of experiment: enough countries need to receive the liberalization “treatment” in sample; enough 
time needs to elapse so that growth can be observed in both pre- and post-treatment phases; and 
growth then has to be compared to a control group of nonliberalizers. 
And  here  is  the  problem:  before  the  Uruguay  round  very  few  developing  countries  had 
engaged in any serious trade liberalizations. Some had begun the process of trade reform (the 
NICs and Chile, for example). But for the most part it was the developed countries that had been 
the main participants in earlier GATT rounds, or in other serious regional trade agreements 
(notably the EU), that had fostered lower tariffs. For example, the GATT’s Kennedy round of 
1962–67  included  only  48  countries.  And  although  the  Tokyo  round  of  1973–79  included 
roughly  100  countries,  including  20  non-GATT  developing  countries,  the  progress  made  in 
reducing developing country trade barriers was negligible. 
In contrast, the Uruguay round 1986–94 included 125 countries and focused strongly on tariff 
reductions in both developed and developing countries. This, we would argue, is the experiment 
that we have been waiting for. Figure 3(a) sums up what the Uruguay round achieved for the 
reductions in average tariff levels (EFW data). To show what happened we plot post-Uruguay 
(year 2000) tariffs against pre-Uruguay (year 1985) tariffs. And we divide the world (i.e., our 
sample) into two groups of countries as follows: 
 
Nonliberalizers: This group of countries did not (or could not) lower tariffs. Hence, 
there are really two sets of countries hiding with this group. 
The first set inherited low tariffs and left them low. These countries are close to the 
origin in Figure 3(a) and they are countries that never received the treatment because they 
have always been open. For example, in 1985, a very open economy like Singapore had 
tariffs as low as 2.2%, which obviously left very little room for further substantive tariff 
reductions after 1970. (Tariffs in Singapore fell to zero in 2000.) Clearly, the trade policy 
element of the Washington Consensus did not speak to this group of countries: they had 
practically converged to free trade before the Uruguay round and without any nagging 
from  the  Beltway.  Thus,  no  growth  accelerations  induced  by  trade  policy  could  be 
expected in these early liberalizers after 1985. 
A second set of countries inherited high tariffs and left them alone, or even raised 
them. These countries are close to the diagonal on the upper right of Figure 3(a) and they 
are countries that never received the treatment because they have always been closed. For 
example, Jordan had an average tariff of 13.8% in 1985 and 24% in 2000, according to 
EFW. Jamaica’s measured tariff fell from 17% in 1985 to just 10.6% in 1999; a cut in   14 
tariffs,  but  not  a  big  one.  Clearly,  the  Washington  Consensus  potentially  could  have 
spoken to these countries, only they did not pay much attention to it. 
Liberalizers: In contrast, a third and final group of countries both could and did 
lower  tariffs  after  1985.  They  had  large  tariffs  to  begin  with  and  cut  them.  These 
countries are below the diagonal on the lower right of Figure 3(a) and they are countries 
that received the treatment because they made a big move from being closed towards 
being  open.  They  are  selected  as  countries  with  an  above  median  decrease  in  tariffs 
between 1985 and 2000. For example, Argentina had average tariffs of 27% in 1985, 
falling  to  12.6%  in  2000.  This  group  also  includes  some  developed  countries:  for 
example, Australia and New Zealand, who also embarked on trade liberalization in the 
1980s and 1990s (but they are example of rich countries that also are net importers of 
capital and intermediate goods, so they also fit the rubric of our model). 
Another classic example would be India with tariffs as high as 98.8% in 1985, falling 
to 32.5% in 1999—still high, but a whole lot lower than before. It is obviously to this 
third  group  of  countries  that  the  Washington  Consensus  spoke.  Their  pre-WC  trade 
policies  placed  an  enormous  “tax”  on  imports  (including  imports  of  capital  and 
intermediate  goods)  that  was  subsequently  removed.  In  fact,  the  true  extent  of 
liberalization was probably much larger than shown here, given the way the tariff data 
were sampled and our inability to measure changes in nontariff barriers.
12 The question is, 
following  this  liberalization,  did  this  treatment  group  see  any  pay  offs  in  terms  of 
improved growth performance? 
 
Figure 3(a) shows that we have suitable control groups and treatment groups for the proposed 
experimental design. Figure 3(b) replicates the approach using our more restricted sample of 
capital and intermediate goods tariffs from our newly collected disaggregated tariff data. Again, 
we can partition the sample to isolate the “off diagonal” countries that embraced the Washington 
Consensus, and those on the diagonal which did not liberalize. 
To further describe the evolution of tariffs in these samples, Figure 4 plots the average tariffs 
for different subsets of countries from 1975 to 2000 using EFW average tariff data. Figure 4(a) 
shows  averages  for  the  whole  sample,  developed  countries  and  developing  countries.  The 
developed world started with lower tariffs and lowered them a little (about 10% falling to about 
                                                 
12 Our tariff variable probably measures the “lower bound” on tariffs in the early period and the “upper bound” tariff 
in the late period. Early tariffs are mostly measured near the end of the period (the late 1980s) and tariffs were 
probably much higher in the mid 1970s (in many countries the difference would probably be small). Similarly, our 
late tariffs exclude further tariff declines for selected trading partners that resulted from the explosive growth of 
preferential bilateral and regional free-trade agreements (FTAs). The difference here could be more substantial in 
some cases. Still, although preferential/regional agreements are seen by some as inimical to the GATT/WTO process 
(Bhagwati 2008), and perhaps also contrary to the spirit of the Washington Consensus, empirical evidence suggest 
that  there  are  substantial  spillovers  from  FTA  tariff  reductions  to  subsequent  unilateral  (ex-WTO)  MFN  tariff 
reductions. According to Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008), a country that provides preferential tariff-free 
access in a sector with a 15% MFN tariff is then likely to subsequently lower its MFN tariff by 3 percentage points, 
suggesting that the WTO mechanism encourages countries to set MFN rates close to prevailing applied rates.   15 
5%), but that the developing world lowered tariffs more dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s 
(about 35% falling to about 15%). 
Figure 4(b) shows average tariffs for the two aforementioned groups. The nonliberalizers saw 
very little movement in their average tariff rate: it stayed about 15% to 20% throughout. The 
control group thus saw very little tariff change from 1975 to 2000. The really dramatic change is 
seen in the treatment group, the liberalizers: initially in 1975, 1980, and 1985 their average tariff 
rates exceeded 40%. But in the WC-era, after the Uruguay round, these countries cut average 
tariffs to a much lower level, around 15%, a cut of about 25 percentage points (similar to the cut 
used  in  our  earlier  model  simulations).  Exploiting  this  contrast  between  liberalizers  and 
nonliberalizers should allow us to identify any pro-growth impacts of trade liberalization. 
Openness as a Discrete Treatment: Difference in Difference Estimates 
We begin our empirical work using the simplest notion of treatment, a dichotomous variable to 
capture those countries thought to have liberalized (Liberalizer=1) versus those that have not 
(Liberalizer=0), using the definitions of the previous section. This approach is the difference-
regression analog of the zero-one openness indicator used by Sachs and Warner (1995) and their 
followers. Thus, if we suppose the levels regression is written 
€ 
growthi =α opennessi [ ]+ βXi +εi,                          (1) 
where X is a vector of control variables, then the differenced regression can be written 
€ 
∆growthi =α ∆opennessi [ ]+ β∆Xi +νi.                        (2) 
By replacing 
€ 
∆opennessi with our indicator variable “Liberalizer” we hope to capture those 
countries which, in the WC-era, shifted to a more liberal trade regime. 
  The resulting difference-in-difference (DD) regressions offer a very clean and simple test of 
the  hypothesis  that  WC-era  liberalizers  grew  faster  than  nonliberalizers  using  data  from 
reasonable sample periods. In our work, there are two periods (T=2). Period 1 is 1975 to 1989 
and period 2 is 1990 to 2005. By splitting the sample into two 15 year periods we can hope to 
avoid any pollution of our conclusions as a result of lags in policy implementation and short-run 
output fluctuations (e.g., business cycles, crises), and yet the time frame is sufficiently short that 
(as our simulations have shown) we should still be able to detect medium-term post-reform 
growth accelerations. Using two periods is also justified by data limitations since we only have 
one pre-reform observation on tariff rates. Finally, restricting analysis to two periods “before” 
and “after” treatment may be a blessing in disguise, since DD methods with T>2 run the risk of 
biased standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). 
In  asking  whether  trade  reform  episodes  were  followed  by  increased  growth  rates,  our 
method is also close in spirit to the study of growth accelerations by Hausmann, Pritchett, and 
Rodrik (2005). We are able to employ more recent data (they use PWT 6.1, but PWT 6.2 adds 4 
extra years). We also differ in using 15-year periods for this analysis, as growth rates over   16 
quinquennia are likely to be volatile and beyond the explanatory powers of a medium run growth 
model (Easterly et al. 1993). The longer time-horizon is also a harsher test: worthwhile policy 
recommendations need to generate enhanced growth performance over many years, not a flash in 
the  pan.  Like  these  authors  we  find  that  sustained  growth  accelerations  are  correlated  with 
economic reforms, although our focus is on trade policy—and a continuous measure, as opposed 
to the discrete Sachs-Warner indicator variable used by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005). 
  Table 1(a) reports the results of these difference regressions. The dependent variable is 
the annual average growth rate of per worker GDP from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2. 
This  first  set  of  regressions  in  columns  1  to  6  include  no  control  variables  other  than 
“Liberalizer”, but “Liberalizer” is defined in various ways. The first definition in column 1 sets 
Liberalizer =1 for countries where the average tariff rate falls by more than the median for the 
entire sample between period 1 and period 2 (N=75). Other definitions in columns 3–6 are like 
the first, except that the tariff on consumption goods, capital goods, intermediate goods, or the 
average of capital/intermediate goods is used, based on our disaggregated tariff data for a smaller 
set of countries (N=47). 
Will the use of different tariff measures matter? One might worry that the results could be 
similar whatever tariff measure is used, making our pursuit of disaggregated tariff data rather 
pointless, since the average tariff would be information enough. Why? Although the measures 
involving capital and/or intermediate goods tariffs should be the better measures of the growth-
enhancing effects of trade policy according to our theory, in practice countries tended to lower 
tariffs of all kinds simultaneously during trade reforms. To examine this problem we can look at 
the correlations between the different discrete liberalization indicators. The correlation between 
the liberalization indicator using average tariffs and that using consumption tariffs was 0.66; the 
correlation between the liberalization indicator using average tariffs and that using capital and 
intermediate tariffs was only 0.57. Clearly, countries did tend to lower all tariffs together, but the 
fact that these correlations are much less than 1 shows that the information contained in average 
tariffs may be polluted by different shifts in consumption tariffs, an element of noise that would 
pollute the tariff-growth correlation if our theory is any guide. 
This caution turns out to be justified. Table 1(a) offers support for the Washington Consensus 
prescription, but it does depend on the tariff measure used. Liberalizing countries grew about 1 
percentage point per annum faster than nonliberalizers in this period. The effect varies slightly 
between about 0.85% and 1.14% depending on the indicator employed, but the effect is found to 
be  slightly  more  significant  when  the  theoretically  “correct”  capital  tariff  data  are  used, 
whereupon the effect then clears the 5% statistical significance hurdle. 
  Table 1(b), columns 1 through 6 repeat the exercise with the inclusion of widely used control 
variables  from  the  growth  literature.  Following  the  state  of  the  art,  standard  reduced-form 
estimates of a growth regression should include only those few controls X that are putatively 
exogenous, such as initial income (log), initial schooling, and initial institutions (Barro 1991). 
Clearly endogenous variables such as investment or trade flows must be omitted from the right 
hand side. Putting the three controls into difference form implies that ￿ X should contain the   17 
lagged level of growth, the change in schooling and the change in institutions. These are now 
added to the Table 1(a) difference regressions. Schooling is total years of schooling (variable: 
tyr) from Barro and Lee (2000). Institutional quality is measured by the EFW legal and property 
rights score (variable: area 2ab). 
  As Table 1(b) shows, the inclusion of these controls neither dramatically strengthens nor 
weakens  the  previous  results.  Columns  1  through  6  show  that  the  liberalization  indicator 
coefficient still enters significantly at the 5% level in columns 3–6. The size of the liberalization 
effect is slightly muted, but still about 0.9% per annum in columns 3–6. 
The coefficient on the lagged growth variable corresponds to the convergence speed, and 
since time is measured in 15-year periods, a coefficient of about 0.53 in Columns 3–6 implies an 
annual convergence speed of almost 4% in log levels. These are not unreasonable convergence 
speeds, certainly compared to the empirical literature and the Solow model (the typical Ramsey 
model calibration implies higher convergence speeds, however). Schooling is not statistically 
significant in any regression. Institutional change is weakly significant only in column 1 at the 
10% level. 
This finally leads us to our preferred OLS specifications in Table 1(c), which exclude the not 
significant institutions and schooling variables. In this final table, the results line up very closely 
with our a priori expectations. Using the crude average tariff variable produces a smaller and 
insignificant coefficient on tariffs, which might explain the often weak and non-robust results in 
the  prior  literature.  Switching  to  disaggregated  tariffs  results  in  a  larger  and  statistically 
significant coefficient on tariffs (at the 5% level). In the final column of the table, where the 
combined capital and intermediate tariffs are used, the coefficient is at its largest, implying a 1 
percentage point per annum growth acceleration for liberalizers, and the effect is now significant 
even at the 1% level. Table 1(d) shows that identical coefficients are obtained when the sample is 
restricted to developing countries, although precision inevitably suffers when the sample is cut 
by about a third. 
These results warrant a few further comments. Our empirics have also surmounted another 
hurdle,  for  as  Easterly  (2005,  1056)  had  shown,  many  earlier  results  in  openness-growth 
literature proved not to be robust to the inclusion of the catch-up term (here in a differenced 
form). The failure of Easterly’s regressions to be robust may not be too surprising, however, 
given that (for survey purposes) he follows the extant literature in using trade share as a measure 
of openness—when, of course, this is an inappropriate outcome variable rather than a direct 
measure of policy. We also find, in contrast to the levels results discussed by Easterly, that our 
growth results are robust to the inclusion of institutional controls, which is not too surprising 
since institutions change very little in the short to medium run. Likewise, changes in schooling 
policies  seem  to  be  either  too  small  to  matter  or  otherwise  uncorrelated  with  acceleration 
outcomes. We would also argue that, in the face of Easterly’s warning about the “arbitrary” 
measures of episodes of policy change (he refers explicitly to Sachs and Warner 1995), we have 
found a very direct measure of trade policy change by looking directly to the changes in trade 
taxes, rather than inferring reform events based on an amalgam of aggregated tariff data, black   18 
market premia, government monopoly measures and so on (Easterly 2005, 1050). Our tariff 
variable may be narrow, but it is cleanly defined and measured. 
Openness as a Continuous Treatment: Difference Estimates 
We do not dwell further on the results from Table 1, since, like the Sachs-Warner openness 
measure, our use of a dichotomous liberalization treatment indicator can be faulted by skeptics 
for throwing away too much information by reducing a variety of policy stances to an on-off 
dummy variable. In what follows we maintain our basic empirical design based on differencing, 
but now we make use of the fact that changes in tariffs provide a continuous treatment measure, 
and  so  we  switch  to  using  difference  regression  with  a  continuous  variable,  the  change  in 
ln(1+tariff), replacing the liberalization indicator variable as the measure of policy change. 
Echoing Table 1(a), Table 2(a) now reports results using the continuous treatment measure 
log(1+tariff) and, for now, no other controls, where the tariff measure is again constructed in 
various ways: for average tariffs (weighted, from EFW), and for tariffs (unweighted, based on 
our own work), where the latter is computed for consumption, capital, intermediates, and an 
average of capital and intermediates. 
In column 1, using average tariffs, we find a tariff-growth coefficient or elasticity of –0.0519, 
which  is  in  line  with  the  lower  end  of  our  theory-based  calibration  estimates.  With  the 
inappropriate consumption tariffs in column 2, this coefficient falls to –0.0222 and is significant 
only at the 10% level. But when we use capital and/or intermediate tariffs in columns 3 to 5 the 
coefficient is much larger. The average capital/intermediate tariff level yields a tariff-growth 
elasticity of –0.0407 in column 5, and clears the 5% significance level. 
Following Table 1(b), Table 2(b) now reports results using the continuous treatment measure 
log(1+tariff) but with additional controls comprising lagged growth, change in schooling and 
change  in  institutions.  Compared  to  the  results  without  controls  in  Table  2(a),  the  tariff 
coefficients are now reduced in magnitude and statistical significance, but the same patterns 
hold, in that the inclusion of the consumption tariff clearly biases the coefficient toward zero. 
However,  yet  again  the  only  control  variable  that  consistently  enters  with  statistical 
significance is, once more, the catch up term using lagged growth. Again, neither institutional 
change nor changes in schooling appear to drive growth accelerations across these two periods at 
conventional significance levels. The catch up coefficient takes values in the range from –0.5 to 
–0.6, so implied convergence speeds are again a reasonable 3%–4% per annum. 
Once more, following Table 1(c), we again turn in Table 2(c) to a parsimonious specification 
that excludes the insignificant institution and schooling variables and constitutes our preferred 
set  of  OLS  results  for  the  continuous  treatment  case.  Again,  the  same  patterns  hold.  Using 
average  tariffs  or  consumption  tariffs  muddies  the  waters  in  columns  1  and  2:  the  tariff 
coefficient is smaller than one might expect (about –0.2) and not robustly significant. In columns 
3 through 5 the coefficient is larger, of a theoretically more plausible magnitude (–0.4), and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 2(d) yet again shows that identical coefficients are 
obtained when the sample is restricted to developing countries, although precision again suffers.   19 
To sum up, the main lesson is that growth gains of a reasonable size are detectable using 
theoretically grounded tariff rates for capital and intermediate goods, but using the wrong tariff 
measures can lead to an understatement of those gains, and bias findings towards a null effect. 
4. Endogenous Treatment? 
One reservation skeptical readers may harbor is that our coefficient on the tariff measure may be 
subject to endogeneity bias. If institutions “rule” then tariff policy is just a symptom, not a cause, 
of better economic performance. This kind of relationship is often summed up in causal diagrams 










(or steady state income)
  .    (3) 
 
Such  diagrams  may  also  be  augmented  by  other  causal  arrows  and  other  factors,  such  as 
geography (see for example similar diagrams in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; or 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). 
Based  on  this  kind  of  causal  logic  and  new  empirical  work,  the  “institutions  view”  has 
supplanted the “policy view” in recent years. But if the effect we have measured is robust, then 
this shift may be premature, or may stem from a false dichotomy. The above causal relationship 
(3) may find support in levels (cross section), but it does not find support in differences (time 
series). As we show in this section, there is no clear and robust relationship between institutional 
changes and trade policy changes in our sample, so it is hard to argue that fixing one trumps 
fixing the other: countries with “bad” (or worsening) institutions have managed to engage in 
trade reform; countries with “good” (or improving) institutions have also failed. 
We therefore seek to construct better instruments for trade policy changes, based on different 
historical reasoning. Our new instruments fare much better and they support the findings from 
the previous section. Indeed, they strengthen the findings, since the use of instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation has the added benefit of addressing problems of measurement error, which can 
be  serious  when  using  tariffs  as  a  measure  of  liberalization  (e.g.,  given  the  problem  of 
unmeasured changes in quotas and other nontariff barriers). 
Endogeneity, Round 1: Institutions as “Deep Determinants” 
The  recent  literature  has  argued  that  “institutions”  are  key  determinants  of  income  levels 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). The difficulty is that good institutions may cause 
higher income but there may also be reverse causality as in (3). The same may also be true of 
other proximate determinants of growth, such as policies. To escape, researchers have had to find 
creative  sources  of  exogenous  variation—and  creative  chains  of  causation—to  perform  IV 
estimation.  Thus  settler  mortality  long  ago  is  now  a  popular  instrument  for  the  quality  of   20 
institutions today (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001); another widely used instrument is 
legal origin (Glaeser et al. 2004).
13 
  These ideas have certainly advanced the rigor of levels accounting. But the problem for us is 
these causal chains and instruments are not relevant once we change the experimental model to a 
difference  estimator  for  medium-term  growth  accounting.  First,  consider  the  instruments. 
Suppose (lagged) settler mortality predicts institutional quality in 1985 in levels; it does so for 
2000 also. But taking first differences we would find (to a first approximation) that the change in 
institutions (one of our regressors) is a function of the change in (lagged) settler mortality. But 
there is likely no change in lagged settler mortality, and certainly none in the available pre-19
th 
century  data;  even  if  there  were,  we  suspect  it  would  not  provide  a  plausible  theory  of 
institutional change over the 15-year period from 1985 to 2000. The same problem would arise 
more starkly if we switched to say, legal origin, as the preferred instrument: legal origins don’t 
change  so  differencing  them  isn’t  an  option.  Similar  problems  apply  to  latitude,  disease 
environment, other geography variables, religion, and so on. To sum up, time invariant “deep 
determinants”  are  useful  for  levels  analysis,  but  inappropriate  for  growth  analysis  using 
difference estimators. 
  The absence or irrelevance of deep determinants is troubling, but we should recall that the 
main concern about our pro-WC results in Tables 1 and 2 is that changes in trade policy might be 
endogenous and really just a proxy for improved institutions. If so, the Rodrik-Subramanian-
Trebbi (2004) critique would bite and the non-significance of our institutional change variables 
would just be the result of misspecification. We now show that, even absent instruments, we can 
find little prima facie evidence that changes in institutions might really be driving everything. 
Table  3  shows  that  institutions  measured  in  levels  might  have  affected  trade  policies 
measured in levels. But the same is not true for differences. We focus panel (a) with the full 
sample. In columns 1 and 4, the level of tariffs in 1985 as measured by ln (1+tariff), is regressed 
on  the  levels  of  “institutions”  in  two  ways:  first,  using  our  previous  measure  of  economic 
institutions, in this case institutions-as-protection (EFW legal & property rights index); and then 
using a “deeper” measure of political institutions, or institutions-as-democracy (Freedom House 
political liberty index). The levels relationship is strong at the 1% significance level, and it is 
consistent with the standard story in the above ordering: countries with “better institutions” had 
lower tariffs. The relationship also survives in a more restricted developing-country sample in 
Panel (b), but only for the EFW measure. 
But for assessing the causes of policy change we care about changes in tariffs. Columns 2 
and  5  regress  changes  in  tariffs  (our  variable  of  interest)  on  levels  of  institutions.  The 
relationship is only significant in the latter case, and in both cases it has a perverse positive sign. 
Better initial institutions were associated with smaller tariff reductions. However, if the widely 
used causal ordering (3) is correct, it should hold in differences too, and then we shouldn’t really 
                                                 
13 To enter institutions into a horse race with trade volumes, settler mortality as an IV has been joined up with 
distance  as  an  IV,  the  latter  being  standard  instrument  for  trade  volume  in  the  gravity  framework  (Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004).   21 
regress changes on levels. Differencing both sides would lead us to regress changes in tariffs on 
changes in institutions. If this yielded a robust association then one might conjecture that the 
Washington  Consensus  tariff  reforms  were  nothing  but  a  symptom  of  deeper  institutional 
changes  that  were—directly  or  indirectly—the  main  reason  for  accelerating  growth  rates. 
Unfortunately, we find no support for that conjecture. Columns 3 and 6 show that institutional 
changes were not correlated with changes in tariffs in the manner suggested by a causal ordering 
such as (3). In both panels (a) and (b) the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
There  is  absolutely  no  stable  or  predictable  relationship  between  levels  or  changes  in 
institutions and changes in tariff policy. Perhaps this is not too surprising. The failure to find a 
change-change relationship could have been anticipated: during the Great Liberalization, as we 
have seen, tariff  policies changed dramatically in many countries, but it is well known that 
institutions, in contrast, are highly persistent. 
The failure to find a level-change relationship could also have been anticipated. It is a truism 
of  contemporary  political  economy  that  we  see  trade  reforms  in  a  variety  of  institutional 
environments;  under  regimes  with  good  and  bad  governance;  under  dictatorships  and 
democracies.  The  regressions  are  telling  us  that  when  the  Great  Liberalization  experiment 
happened in the treatment group it was not a biased sample of countries in terms of either the 
level or trend of institutional quality. 
Endogeneity, Round 2: The Great Depression, GATT, and Reglobalization 
Now we look in new directions for exogenous variation in 1980s and 1990s trade policy, since 
contemporary changes in institutions seem to have been mostly irrelevant. 
  Instead, we take the view that the main exogenous shock to trade policy in the last 100 years 
was the period of the so-called Great Reversal, from 1914 to 1945. Wars damaged trade but even 
more damage was done by policy reactions during and after the Great Depression (Kindleberger 
1989; Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor 2003; Glick and Taylor forthcoming). Policies were 
mediated  via  a  multitude  of  political  economy  channels  leading  to  a  persistent  protectionist 
environment after 1945 that was a far cry from the liberal world order of 1913. Tariffs were 
much higher than in 1913 in most places, and whilst almost nobody had seen NTBs (quotas) in 
1913 they were in widespread use by 1945. 
Into this autarkic scene came the postwar international organization charged with rebuilding 
a broken world trading system: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) created in 
1947, and succeeded much later, in 1995, by the World Trade Organization (WTO). GATT 
organized multiple rounds of multilateral bargaining to reduce tariffs among member states. In 
order to achieve tariff reductions under GATT, countries had to engage in a negotiation game 
where they exchanged proposed lists of tariff cuts with partners; if such cuts were then agreed, 
they were extended to all parties via the “most favored nation” (MFN) mechanism. But with 
most developing countries not taking any serious part in GATT until the Uruguay Round, and 
with very few  of  them engaging in major unilateral trade liberalization that was robust and 
enduring (the exceptions being the East Asian NICs), the majority entered the Uruguay Round   22 
with tariff levels that could be traced back through a history of domestic postwar policymaking 
to the great shifts in trade policies in the 1930s. 
How can we use this set of historical disturbances to the global economy to address the 
possible endogeneity of our liberalization treatment variables? We argue that a useful causal 
ordering from which we can extract an exogenous component for the speed and extent of tariff 
























1975 – 90 to
1990 – 2005
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In essence we argue that the world was disturbed by the interwar shocks in such a way that all 
countries moved away from liberal economic policies. But how far and how long they did so 
was, in part, decided by how much of an adverse shock they suffered in the Great Depression. 
We  now  explain  and  defend  this  identification  strategy,  and  show  how  we  construct  two 
instruments called “GATT Potential” which are good candidate predictors of both the ability and 
willingness of countries to lower tariffs in the Uruguay round. 
The first GATT Potential variable is defined as the interaction of an indicator of GATT 
membership in 1975 with the pre–Uruguay Round tariff level. These two factors were likely to 
promote tariff reduction, given the politics and mechanics of trade negotiations under GATT. To 
see a big tariff cut, a country had to have high tariffs to be able to offer to cut them by a large 
amount (tariffs cannot be negative); a country also had to enter the Uruguay round with a strong 
willingness  to  cut  tariffs  (which  we  proxy  by  1975  GATT  membership).  In  essence  the 
construction of this variable focuses on the second arrow in the above causal ordering (4), using 
the decision on countries to enter GATT earlier as indicative of their supposedly historically-
determined inclination to liberalize. 
Still, one problem with this instrument is that we might ask: why were countries willing to 
enter GATT by 1975 and then cut tariffs in the Uruguay round? The two decisions were likely to 
be correlated, and so our first variable may not be a valid instrument, as the exclusion restriction 
might fail. Perhaps some countries knew in 1975 that good trade-related growth opportunities 
had opened up? In that case we might need a deeper, historical determinant of attitudes to trade 
reform, which exploits the first causal arrow in the ordering (4). Here we rely on arguments from 
the political-economy literature—concerning the long-lasting effects of the Great Depression on   23 
policymakers—that  are  familiar,  but  which  have  been  rarely  used  as  sources  of  exogenous 
variation in contemporary economic policies.
14 
Writing in mid-century, Polanyi (1944) argued that the Great Depression marked a turn away 
from the market and a return to a “natural” state of the world in which markets were embedded 
in a social order. In Polanyi’s view, the liberal, laissez faire era of the long nineteenth century 
was an historical aberration, and the freewheeling globalization it spawned was not sustainable in 
the long run as a political-economic equilibrium. The interwar crisis was the breaking point. 
However, if Polanyi and those sympathetic to his view expected the extreme autarky of the 
1930s and 1940s to persist, they were to be disappointed. 
From the 1950s to the 1970s the global economy was gradually rebuilt under international 
co-operation, under the auspices of the OECD, GATT, IMF, IBRD, EEC, and a host of other 
acronyms. Still, this new construct was not necessarily the same as a return to the supposed 
laissez faire of the pre-1914 years. Trade barriers were only dismantled slowly. An influential 
characterization of the postwar era is that of Ruggie (1982) who argues that the persistence of 
post-war trade protection was part of a broader social contract, an “embedded liberalism” where 
the market economy sat within a managed system that allowed policymakers to contain what 
they saw as the adverse distributional impacts and volatility created by unfettered free markets. 
Moving forward in time, however, as noted by Rodrik (2000), this embedding seems to have 
weakened considerably as the next great globalization, or reglobalization, unfolded in the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s. For some, this recent trend suggest a reversion towards a 19
th century free 
trading world, which would permit us to characterize the long sweep of the 20
th century as a 
liberal order in 1900, followed by a massive deglobalization shock that took the system toward 
protectionism,  and  which  then  slowly  unwound  as,  at  their  own  different  speeds,  countries 
gradually relaxed their autarkic stance and re-embraced a more open posture in 2000.
15 
However, this crude description of a “temporary” deviation from laissez faire hides many 
details. What determined the action and re-action? Why did the speeds vary? What had been the 
impetus for that sea change in economic thinking, given the orthodox free trade views handed 
down by posterity through the long nineteenth century and up to the 1920s? 
The conventional answer is: The Great Depression; the crisis of world capitalism generated a 
political economy response. However, if this argument is valid, we would not expect it to create 
an identical response in all countries, and we ought to be able to find enduring legacies of the 
Great  Depression  in  subsequent  postwar  policy  choices.  Specifically,  we  test  this  “Great 
Depression Hypothesis” to see if the depth of the 1930s downturn can serve as a predictor of 
slow trade liberalization later on, as in the causal ordering (4) above. Why? Given the account of 
                                                 
14 An illuminating exception is Siegler and van Gaasbeck (2005), who find a cross-country correlation between the 
depth  of  the  output  trough  during  the  1930s  Great  Depression  and  the  weight  placed  on  output  in  a  standard 
monetary policy Taylor rule in the Great Inflation of the 1970s. 
15 Was Polanyi wrong? “It’s too soon to tell” is a tempting response, but on the 20
th century timescale the predictions 
look poor. Prior to the 19
th century the role of the market is also hotly disputed, with some historians seeing a 
dominant role for mostly free markets back to the medieval period. See for example the arguments of Greg Clark 
and Fred Block at http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2008/06/polanyis-the-gr.html .   24 
history  by  Polanyi,  Ruggie,  Rodrik  (and  many  others),  we  would  expect  the  embrace  of 
globalization by developing countries not to be uniform, but to be conditioned by their own 
history—with attitudes towards free trade ultimately mediated by politics, the power of interest 
groups, the persistence of beliefs, and so on. 
Thus  our  second  GATT  Potential  instrument  is  calculated  as  the  interaction  of  Great 
Depression intensity with our initial period tariff level. Since 1930s growth experience was far 
removed from 1980s and 1990s growth experience, and related to many factors specific to that 
era such as terms of trade shocks in the commodity lottery and the collapse of the gold standard, 
we have good a priori reason to believe that the exclusion restriction will be valid and there will 
be no direct impact of 1930s experiences on growth accelerations circa 1990. 
So we can construct two instruments as follows for each country, which we think should be 
strong instruments for potential for tariff reductions under the Uruguay round of GATT between 
1985 and 2000, the early and late periods in our study: 
 
€ 
GATT Potential 1= ln(1+tariff1985)×[GATT member in 1975]; 
€ 
GATT Potential 2 = ln(1+ tariff1985) ×
Average deviation of 1930– 35








The former uses the Rose (2004) database for GATT membership dates. The latter uses the 
Maddison (2001) database for historical GDP data. 
Reassuringly, our findings are robust when we switch use these measures of GATT Potential 
as an instrument, and Tables 4 and 5 report IV estimates of our differenced growth regression 
using each of these two instruments. 
On a priori grounds we thought that our GATT potential variables ought to be correlated with 
tariff cuts, and they are. Figure 5 shows the strong bivariate correlation between the instruments 
and the change in tariffs. Column 1 in each table shows the coefficient and standard errors on the 
instrument in the first-stage regression where the dependent variable is the change in capital and 
intermediate tariffs. The t-statistics are high, around 7 or 8. If we are willing to accept that the 
instruments are valid, then they are certainly not weak. 
Column 2 in each table presents the IV estimates of the second-stage differenced growth 
regression on the full sample. The coefficient on tariffs is similar to and never more than slightly 
larger than the OLS coefficients in Table 4, suggesting that bias problems are not severe. Most 
importantly the IV coefficients are significant at the 5% level, even in the restricted sample using 
disaggregated tariffs. As a robustness check, in Columns 3 and 4 of each table we add schooling 
and institutions variables and the results are unaffected, with the tariff-growth elasticity still 
estimated  at  about  –0.05  and  significant  at  the  5%  level.  Identical  coefficients  obtain  from 
regressions restricted to the developing country sample (not shown), but with lower precision.
16 
                                                 
16  Precision  suffers  especially  when  we  use  the  Great  Depression  instrument,  because  we  only  have  N=16 
developing country observations in the Maddison GDP database for the period 1929 to 1935.   25 
5. Corroborations 
This study has focused on the reduced-form relationship between trade liberalization and growth 
implied  by  a  simple  two-sector  open  economy  growth  model.  We  have  seen  that  empirical 
evidence from the post–Uruguay Round “Great Liberalization” experiment offers support for the 
model. Liberalizers grew faster than nonliberalizers. But is this finding fully persuasive? 
Easterly (2005) warns that evidence of this sort should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that 
all of the structural linkages suggested by theory are also verified in the data, otherwise the 
correlation of policy change and growth may be spurious. To that end, Table 6 examines some 
correlated  variables  that  we  would  expect  to  see  change  given  the  purported  liberalization-
growth mechanism. It is, by now, unnecessary to explain that we view all of these variables 
through  the  difference-in-difference  framework:  we  examine  the  before-and-after  levels  in 
liberalizers and nonliberalizers (based on the full sample with average tariffs) and look for the 
right direction of change. 
  Panel (a) looks at the PWT price index for investment goods. If the theory is correct then 
capital importers who liberalize should see the domestic price of investment goods fall relative to 
nonliberalizers, even if this effect may be muted due to the presence of nontraded goods. The 
results conform to theory: liberalizers saw their investment goods price index fall by 0.166 log 
points relative to nonliberalizers, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
absolute  terms,  investment  goods  prices  actually  rose  slightly  in  nonliberalizers,  but  fell 
considerably among the liberalizers. 
  Panel (b) looks at the investment to GDP ratio from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. In the Solow variant of the model this ratio would rise due to relative price effects. In 
the Ramsey variant, a rise in the marginal product of capital (due to the fall in the “tax” on 
investment) would occasion an even larger increase in the investment share. The same would 
also  be  true  in  an  open  economy  model  with  internationally  mobile  capital  and  costs  of 
investment: with saving and investment decisions separable, and with the marginal product of 
capital rising, investment would also rise. The results conform to theory: liberalizers saw their 
investment  share  rise  by  2.035%  of  GDP  relative  to  nonliberalizers.  Both  groups  saw  their 
investment  shares  fall  from  the  early  to  the  late  period,  reflecting  a  global  slowdown  in 
investment  and  growth  from  one  period  to  the  next  (cf.  Dollar  and  Kraay  2004).  But  the 
difference-in-difference cares not about factors common to both treatment and control groups, 
only their differences. By this reckoning, the nonliberalizers suffered a large investment collapse 
(–2.2%), while the liberalizers saw little change (–0.2%). 
  Panel (c) looks at the total capital inflow to GDP ratio (measured by the financial account). 
This variable did not appear in our baseline models with immobile capital, but it would be 
present in similar open economy models with internationally mobile capital. Positive news for 
investment and growth would, all else equal, increase investment. It could also decrease saving 
(due to intertemporal smoothing against higher future income). The results conform to theory 
again: liberalizers saw their capital inflows accelerate relative to nonliberaliers, by +0.620% of   26 
GDP. But what is striking in the underlying data is that although nonliberalizers saw inflows 
(+1.597%)  turn  around  into  outflows  (–0.932%),  the  liberalizers  managed  to  remain  net 
recipients of capital (–3.699% rising to only –1.790%). In an era when capital seemed to flow 
mysteriously “uphill” from poor to rich countries—and the United States in particular emerged 
as a major borrower—the liberalizing countries in our sample stand out as a rare example of 
continued “downhill” capital flow, as theory would predict. However, we note the difference in  
total capital flows is not statistically significant (p=0.489). 
  To provide some clarification of this finding, panel (d) isolates the changes in private capital 
flows. As is well known, many emerging markets and developing countries have been amassing 
large official reserves in the last decade or two, so the reserve part of the financial account (the 
official settlements balance) may give a distorted picture of the incentives for private capital 
flows. For example, governments and central banks might be piling up reserves for mercantilist 
reasons or as a buffer to guard against sudden stops or sudden flights (Aizenman and Noy 2008; 
Jeanne  2007;  Obstfeld,  Shambaugh,  and  Taylor  2008).  In  that case,  this  extra precautionary 
saving should be factored out before attempting to deduce shifts in market-directed capital flows. 
As panel (d) reveals, the ability of liberalizers to continue to attract private capital flows relative 
to nonliberalizers was even more dramatic than for total flows, a difference of +1.948% of GDP, 
which  is  statistically  significant  at  a  not-so  marginal  7%  level.  Private  capital  inflows  to 
nonliberalizers collapsed from 2.419% to 0.320%, but liberalizers saw almost no change in their 
private capital inflows, which fell only slightly from 1.925% to 1.773% of GDP. These results 
suggest that financial liberalization could be seen as a key complementary reform, allowing trade 
liberalizers to better finance their post-reform investment needs, a topic for future research.
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  These results on key correlates suggest that the theoretical mechanisms proposed to explain 
higher  growth  were  also  operating  in  the  right  directions  to  lower  capital  prices,  boost 
investment, and encourage private capital flows to those countries that liberalized. 
6. Conclusions 
Despite the predictions of theory, it is now unfashionable to argue that lower trade barriers will 
make developing countries better off, via faster growth in the medium run and higher output in 
the  longer  run.  The  argument  seems  to  have  failed  because  little  robust  evidence  has  been 
assembled—a result of poor empirical design, data scarcity, and a focus on sample periods when 
relatively little experimentation with trade policy actually occurred. We sought to overcome 
these obstacles by using a more suitable experimental design, collecting and assembling new 
data, and focusing on periods that bracket the watershed event in trade policy for developing 
countries, the Uruguay Round of GATT. 
What can we conclude? We think these results show that there is quite strong support for the 
trade policy prescriptions of the 1990s Washington Consensus. The WC claimed that lowering 
                                                 
17  See  Henry  (2007)  for  an  example  of  a  study  of  the  gains  from  financial  liberalization  using  the  “policy 
experiment” approach favored in this paper.   27 
tariffs would promote growth in the developing world. Theory suggests a mechanism: lower 
tariffs will lead to cheaper capital and intermediate goods imports. The only way to test the claim 
is after the fact, by looking at which countries took this “medicine” and how they fared relative 
to those that didn’t, using a classic treatment-and-control method to detect acceleration effects. 
The results run contrary to the view that trade liberalization has failed to deliver growth 
benefits. They also contrast with influential cross-country empirical work that documents a weak 
or nonexistent relationship between tariffs levels and growth rates in the pre-1990 (pre-WC) 
period. That may have been the case then, but these earlier studies were almost surely hobbled by 
omitted variables and most certainly could not examine post-Uruguay, post-WC policy changes 
and economic performance. As Figure 4 shows, the Great Liberalization of the 1990s constitutes 
the great trade policy experiment of our era, and only now can we begin to evaluate its impact. 
We have to be concerned not to oversell these results. WC supporters have been faulted for 
expecting implausibly high impacts from their policy prescriptions. Based on our empirics, all 
we  can  say  is  that  the  impact  of  tariff  reduction  looks  quite  beneficial  and  has  a  plausible 
magnitude consistent with theory. The effects we find are not so large as to be dismissed as 
implausible like some of the claims encountered in the WC debate, but at the same time our 
effects are still large enough to make a nontrivial cumulative difference in outcomes over the 
long run.  Our results show that liberalizers have grown faster than nonliberalizers after this 
“experiment”—a result that survives in multiple specifications. Our findings are summarized in 
Figure 6, which shows growth accelerations for liberalizers and nonliberalizers (based on our 
preferred tariff measure for capital and intermediate goods). The level of GDP per worker is 
shown  relative  to  the  baseline  trend  for  each  group  during  the  1975–89  “before”  period. 
Liberalizers clearly accelerated, whilst nonliberalizers stagnated. After 15 years, the difference 
between the two is about 15%–20%, implying a differential acceleration of about 1% per annum 
in favor of the liberalizers, in line with the basic results of Table 1.
18 
An extra 1% of growth each year may not sound like a lot. It is surely small compared to 
what  “institutional  convergence”  might  deliver,  by  which  poor-country  TFP  levels  could  be 
raised to OECD levels—but there are few credible prescriptions to achieve that goal. Moreover, 
is there any other single policy prescription of the last 20 years that can be argued to have 
contributed between 15%–20% to developing country incomes? To see the impact in a different 
perspective, we can also consider the growth needed to reduce poverty in accordance with the 
Millennium Development Goals. As noted by Kraay (2007, 140–41), an extra 1% of growth is 
sufficient on its own to meet that goal in several developing countries, and it would make a 
contribution of between one half and one third to achieving that goal in many other countries. So 
the impact is hardly negligible and, for the mass of people clustered near the poverty line, a 
15%–20% GDP boost over 15 years will make a very tangible difference. 
                                                 
18 Although our methods for identifying liberalizations are different, as noted earlier, this 1% per annum impact is 
broadly consistent with other recent findings based on treatment-control or difference-in-difference methods (Dollar 
and Kraay 2004; Wacziarg and Welch 2008).   28 
  In summary, the results serve to remind us of a nuanced but often overlooked point about 
trade policy in developing countries. It is the structure of protection, as much as its level, that 
matters for growth. Poor countries are net importers of capital goods, and most are net importers 
of intermediate goods too. Demand for some types of goods, such as advanced equipment and 
machines, is satisfied almost wholly by imports. Long ago, Díaz Alejandro (1970) pointed out 
that if—like the Argentines—you double the price of a machine via trade barriers, then you are 
placing an enormous tax on investment and accumulation that will depress output. Historical 
evidence accords with his view (De Long and Summers 1991; Jones 1994; Taylor 1994, 1998) 
Consumption  tariffs  may  have  limited  or  ambiguous  impacts  on  growth  (welfare  is  another 
matter), but capital and intermediate tariffs impose a very clear cost on national efficiency.  
Recent trade liberalizations—and their intellectual underpinnings, whether we label them the 
“Washington  Consensus”  or  not—should  take  some  credit  for  unwinding  many  of  those 
inefficiencies from the 1980s to today. Where those barriers have dropped growth accelerations 
have been significantly higher than where barriers have remained. Some countries have reaped 
the benefits. More could yet do so and enjoy higher incomes and lower poverty rates—but this is 
less likely to happen if any new consensus says that trade policy doesn’t matter very much. 
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Table 1 
Discrete Treatment Variable: Difference in Difference Regressions 
 
(a) Without controls 
Sample  Full  Restricted  Restricted  Restricted  Restricted 
Tariff measure  Average  Consumption  Capital  Intermediate  Capital & 
Intermediate 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Liberalizer indicator  0.0114**  0.00875*  0.00960**  0.00847*  0.0109** 
  (0.0046)  (0.0045)  (0.0044)  (0.0045)  (0.0044) 
Observations  75  47  47  47  47 
R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.12 
 
(b) With growth model controls 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Liberalizer indicator  0.00717*  0.00842**  0.00862**  0.00898**  0.00952** 
  (0.0037)  (0.0038)  (0.0037)  (0.0036)  (0.0036) 
Growth lagged  -0.574***  -0.532***  -0.518***  -0.547***  -0.522*** 
  (0.079)  (0.094)  (0.094)  (0.092)  (0.092) 
Change in schooling  -0.000346  0.00149  0.00129  0.00110  0.00149 
  (0.0027)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0029) 
Change in institutions  0.0271*  0.0212  0.0178  0.0171  0.0188 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Observations  70  44  44  44  44 
R-squared  0.57  0.52  0.53  0.54  0.54 
 
(c) Excluding institutions and schooling 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Liberalizer indicator  0.00373  0.00792**  0.00774**  0.00907**  0.00947*** 
  (0.0035)  (0.0035)  (0.0035)  (0.0034)  (0.0034) 
Growth lagged  -0.586***  -0.496***  -0.486***  -0.512***  -0.487*** 
  (0.073)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.086) 
Observations  75  47  47  47  47 
R-squared  0.51  0.47  0.46  0.49  0.49 
 
(d) Excluding institutions and schooling and with the sample restricted to developing countries only 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Liberalizer indicator  0.00561  0.00818  0.00795  0.0114**  0.0108** 
  (0.0048)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0052)  (0.0052) 
Growth lagged  -0.595***  -0.472***  -0.461***  -0.483***  -0.462*** 
  (0.080)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Observations  53  31  31  31  31 
R-squared  0.56  0.44  0.44  0.48  0.47 
 
Dependent variable is difference in the average change per annum of log GDP per worker. 
Period 1 is 1975–1989 and period 2 is 1990–2004. 
Developing countries are those with IMF IFS codes 186 (Turkey), 199 (South Africa), plus all codes 200 and higher. 
Full sample uses EFW trade taxes as a tariff proxy. Restricted sample uses disaggregated tariff data. 
Tariffs are measured in 1985 and 2000 or closest date thereto. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant terms not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   32 
Table 2 
Continuous Treatment Variable: Difference Regressions 
 
(a) No controls 
Sample  Full  Restricted  Restricted  Restricted  Restricted 
Tariff measure  Average  Consumption  Capital  Intermediate  Capital & 
Intermediate 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
€ 
∆ln(1+ tariff)  -0.0519***  -0.0222*  -0.0516**  -0.0316*  -0.0407** 
  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.020) 
Observations  75  47  47  47  47 
R-squared  0.09  0.06  0.10  0.07  0.08 
 
(b) With growth model controls 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
€ 
∆ln(1+ tariff)  -0.0270*  -0.0199*  -0.0378*  -0.0285*  -0.0333* 
  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Growth lagged  -0.576***  -0.541***  -0.524***  -0.541***  -0.534*** 
  (0.079)  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.095) 
Change in schooling  -0.000299  0.00179  0.000942  0.000591  0.000722 
  (0.0027)  (0.0031)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0030) 
Change in institutions  0.0234*  0.0180  0.0123  0.0120  0.0123 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Observations  70  44  44  44  44 
R-squared  0.57  0.50  0.51  0.51  0.51 
 
(c) Excluding institutions and schooling 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
€ 
∆ln(1+ tariff)  -0.0226  -0.0210**  -0.0430**  -0.0325**  -0.0382** 
  (0.014)  (0.0100)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Growth lagged  -0.579***  -0.501***  -0.487***  -0.507***  -0.499*** 
  (0.072)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.087) 
Observations  75  47  47  47  47 
R-squared  0.52  0.46  0.47  0.47  0.48 
 
(d) Excluding institutions and schooling and with the sample restricted to developing countries only 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Liberalizer indicator  -0.0237  -0.0198  -0.0453*  -0.0321*  -0.0389* 
  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.021) 
Growth lagged  -0.591***  -0.470***  -0.454***  -0.476***  -0.467*** 
  (0.079)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Observations  53  31  31  31  31 
R-squared  0.57  0.44  0.46  0.46  0.46 
 
Dependent variable is difference in the average change per annum of log GDP per worker. 
Period 1 is 1975–1989 and period 2 is 1990–2004. 
Developing countries are those with IMF IFS codes 186 (Turkey), 199 (South Africa), plus all codes 200 and higher. 
Full sample uses EFW trade taxes as a tariff proxy. Restricted sample uses disaggregated tariff data. 
Tariffs are measured in 1985 and 2000 or closest date thereto. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant terms not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   33 
Table 3 
Institutions and Trade Policy: Correlation in Levels but Not in Changes 
 
(a) All countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












Institutions, lagged  -0.415  0.211         
  (0.071)***  (0.068)***         
Institutions, change      0.159       
      (0.106)       
Political liberty, lagged        -0.148  0.053   
        (0.040)***  (0.370)**   
Political liberty, change            -0.054 
            (0.056) 
Observations  91  83  83  84  79  74 
R-squared  0.28  0.11  0.03  0.14  0.03  0.01 
 
(b) Developing countries only 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












Institutions, lagged  -0.277  0.231         
  (0.123)**  (0.127)*         
Institutions, change      0.136       
      (0.126)       
Political liberty, lagged        0.019  -0.023   
        (0.058)  (0.060)   
Political liberty, change            -0.036 
            (0.069) 
Observations  69  61  61  62  57  52 
R-squared  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 
Dependent variable is change or lag of log(1+average tariff) 
Period 1 is 1975–1989 and period 2 is 1990–2004 
Tariffs are measured in 1985 and 2000 or closest date thereto. 
Institutions is from Economic Freedom in the World (Area 2ab rescaled to 0-1). 
Political Liberty is from Freedom House (rescaled to 0-1). 
Developing countries are those with IMF IFS codes 186 (Turkey), 199 (South Africa), plus all codes 200 and higher. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant terms not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
   34 
Table 4 
IV Regressions 1 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  First stage  Second 
stage 











GATT Potential 1  -0.517***    -0.548***   
  (0.072)    (0.067)   
€ 
∆ln(1+ tCapital&Intermediate)    -0.0537**    -0.0482** 
    (0.021)    (0.021) 
Growth lagged  -0.0453  -0.496***  0.159  -0.524*** 
  (0.58)  (0.088)  (0.56)  (0.096) 
Change in schooling      -0.00648  0.000546 
      (0.018)  (0.0031) 
Change in institutions      0.291***  0.0146 
      (0.10)  (0.017) 
Observations  44  47  44  44 
R-squared  0.56  0.46  0.64  0.50 
 
Period 1 is 1975–1989 and period 2 is 1990–2004 
Tariffs are measured in 1985 and 2000 or closest date thereto. 
€ 
∆ln(1+ tCapital&Intermediate) is instrumented by GATT Potential 1 in columns 2 and 4. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant terms not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5 
IV Regressions 2 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  First stage  Second 
stage 











GATT Potential 2  -0.650***    -0.659***   
  (0.025)    (0.027)   
€ 
∆ln(1+ tCapital&Intermediate)    -0.0541**    -0.0507** 
    (0.020)    (0.022) 
Growth lagged  0.146  -0.394***  0.0942  -0.409*** 
  (0.20)  (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.12) 
Change in schooling      0.00119  0.000792 
      (0.0061)  (0.0033) 
Change in institutions      -0.0447  -0.00697 
      (0.035)  (0.018) 
Observations  31  31  31  31 
R-squared  0.96  0.43  0.96  0.44 
 
Period 1 is 1975–1989 and period 2 is 1990–2004 
Tariffs are measured in 1985 and 2000 or closest date thereto. 
€ 
∆ln(1+ tCapital&Intermediate) is instrumented by GATT Potential 2 in columns 2 and 4. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant terms not reported. 




Variable  Difference in Difference: 
Liberalizers minus Nonliberalizers, 







       
(a) Log absolute price of investment goods 
(Penn World Table) 




  N=82, p=.045     
       
(b) Investment share of GDP, % 
(World Development Indicators) 




  N=83, p=.054     
       
(c) Total capital inflows as % of GDP 
(financial account, IFS) 




  N=58 p=.489     
       
(d) Private capital inflows as % of GDP 
(nonreserve financial account, IFS) 




  N=58, p=.070     
 
Notes: Liberalizers and nonliberalizers defined by average tariff. Before is 1975–1989. After is 1990–2004. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1: Growth Simulations When All Goods Are Traded. 
 




Increase in average growth rate 






I and X tariffs 
Solow model  0.36%  1.85%  2.25% 
Ramsey model  0.54%  2.02%  2.60% 
 
Notes: In the figure, the simulations are labeled as follows. 
I: Remove 25% I (capital goods) tariff 
X: Remove 25% X (intermediate goods) tariff 
XI: Remove 25% I and X tariffs. 
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Figure 2: Growth Simulations When Most X and I Goods Are Nontraded. 
 
 





Increase in average growth rate 






I and X tariffs 
Solow model  0.11%  0.30%  0.42% 
Ramsey model  0.13%  0.32%  0.47% 
 
Notes: In the figure, the simulations are labeled as follows. 
I: Remove 25% I (capital goods) tariff 
X: Remove 25% X (intermediate goods) tariff 
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Figure 3: The Great Liberalization: Treatment and Control Groups 
 
(a) Average tariffs, ln (1+t): after versus before 
 
 
(b) Capital and intermediate goods tariffs, ln (1+tki): after versus before 
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Figure 4: The Great Liberalization: Trends in Tariffs 
 























Notes: The samples are as follows (*=developing country). 
Liberalizers:  Austria,  Turkey*,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Argentina*,  Bolivia*,  Brazil*,  Chile*,  Colombia*,  Costa 
Rica*, Ecuador*, Guatemala*, Mexico*, Nicaragua*, Paraguay*, Peru*, Uruguay*, Venezuela*, Iran*, Egypt*, Bangladesh*, Sri 
Lanka*, India*, Indonesia*, South Korea*, Nepal*, Pakistan*, Philippines*, Thailand*, Central Afr. Rep.*, Congo, Rep. Of*, 
Benin*, Gabon*, Ghana*, Cote d'Ivoire*, Kenya*, Mali*, Senegal*, Tanzania*, Uganda*, Zambia*, China*. 
Nonliberalizers:  United  States,  United  Kingdom,  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, South Africa*, Oman*, 
Unit.  Arab  Em.*,  Hong  Kong*,  Malaysia*,  Singapore*,  Botswana*,  Namibia*,  Haiti*,  Bahamas*,  Barbados*,  Guyana*, 
Jamaica*, Trinidad & Tob.*, Cyprus*, Jordan*, Algeria*, Malawi*, Mauritius*, Morocco*, Zimbabwe*, Tunisia*, Pap. New 
Guinea*, Poland*.   40 
Figure 5: Instruments Are Not Weak 
 
(a)  Bivariate Scatter of change in tariff versus GATT Potential 1 
using GATT Membership in 1975 times log initial tariff 
 
 
(b) Bivariate Scatter of change in tariff versus GATT Potential 2 
using Great Depression intensity times log initial tariff 
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Figure 6: The Great Liberalization and Growth Accelerations 
 
Log income per worker (PWT) relative to 1975–89 trend in liberalizers and nonliberalizers 
 
 
Notes: The samples are as in Figure 4, based on changes in tariffs for capital and intermediate goods.   42 
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 shows the sources for disaggregated data on tariffs for this sample of countries in the 
early (ca. 1985) and late (ca. 2000) benchmark years. 
Compilation of disaggregated tariff data is a key component of our empirical research strategy in this 
study. We use a newly constructed tariff dataset for 37 countries in two benchmarks periods: a pre-
liberalization period (circa mid-1980s) and a post liberalization period (circa 2000). The sample includes: 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium-Luxembourg, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, 
Ecuador,  France,  Germany,  Hong  Kong  (China),  India,  Indonesia,  Italy,  Japan,  Korea  (Republic  of), 
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Taipei (China), Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
We use for both periods Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied customs duty. For the late benchmark 
we  rely  on  pre-compiled  tariff  data  by  the  UNCTAD’s  TRAINS  (Trade  Analysis  and  Information 
System). However, for the earliest benchmark, UNCTAS’s TRAINS only covers 11 countries in our 
sample.  Tariff  data  for  a  number  of  European  Union  countries  are  based  on  UNCTAD’s  TRAINS 
complemented with EU Tariff Schedules. For the rest of the sample we had no option but to collect the 
tariff data by hand, line by line, from national tariff schedules from the 1980s. Tariff data for all Latin 
American  Countries  (Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Paraguay,  Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela) comes from national customs schedules provided by ALADI. 
For  China,  Korea,  Pakistan,  Philippines,  Japan,  Singapore,  Taipei  (China)  we  used  (scanned  and 
translated) published national tariff schedules available at the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.):  
o  China:  The  official  Chinese  customs  guide,  General  Office  of  the  Customs  General 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 1985/1986. 
o  Japan: Customs tariff schedules of Japan, Nihon Kanzei Kyokai, 1985. 
o  Korea (Republic): Korea customs law and regulations, Korea Customs Research Institute, 1984. 
o  Pakistan: Pakistan customs tariff and import trade guide, Karachi Law Publishers, 1985-1986. 
o  Philippines: Commentaries on the revised Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines: P.D. no. 
1464, as amended by Executive order no. 688, Central Lawbook Pub. Co., 1983. 
o  Singapore:  Singapore  Trade  Classification  and  Customs  Duties,  Trade  Development  Board 
(Singapore), 1985 
o  Taipei (China): Customs import tariff of the Republic of China: revised edition, Jan. 1985., Hai 
guan zong shui wu si shu, 1985. 
In general, the tariff data were obtained in national nomenclatures based on the Harmonized System 
nomenclature (HS). The data had to be averaged out into 6-digit HS Sub-headings, and then each 6-digit 
tariff line were linked to their corresponding codes using the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) 
classification by means of conversion tables for the 1988 and 2006 versions of the HS, also obtained from 
WITS.  Finally,  the  BEC  categories  were  mapped  out  to  the  System  of  National  Accounts  (SNA) 
categories to distinguish between capital, intermediate and consumption goods. 
For the purposes of this research project we had to make some adjustments of the SNA categories. 
The concordance procedure for the early benchmark was especially difficult since it varied according to 
the source of the data. Tariff data for Latin American countries was usually provided in NALADISA 
nomenclature and it had to be correlated first into Standard International Trade Classification (SITC, Rev. 
2),  and  then  converted  into  BEC  and  SNA.  Tariff  data  for  other  countries  (national  schedules)  used 
generally the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature (CCCN), the predecessor to the HS. For these 
data, a conversion table had to be produced manually connecting the CCCN to the SNA categories via the 
SITC and BEC. In particular, tariff schedules for China and Pakistan were not fully consistent with the 
standard CCCN, so ad-hoc conversions and assumptions had to be made for these two countries.   43 
Appendix Table 1: Sources for Disaggregated Tariffs 
Country  MFN Tariff Data
1 
Name    Late Benchmark  Early Benchmark  Source for Early Benchmark 
Early Benchmark in 
TRAINS 
Argentina    2000  1985  NAT  1992 
Algeria    2001  1992  TRAINS   
Australia    2000  1991  TRAINS   
Austria    2000  1990  TRAINS   
Bangladesh    2000  1989  TRAINS   
Belgium-Luxembourg*    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
Bolivia    2000  1985  NAT  1993 
Brazil    2000  1985  NAT  1989 
Canada    2000  1989  TRAINS   
Chile    2000  1985  NAT  1992 
China    2000  1985  NAT  1992 
Colombia    2000  1985  NAT  1991 
Côte d’Ivoire    2001  1993  TRAINS   
Denmark    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
Ecuador    1999  1985  NAT  1993 
Finland    2000  1988  TRAINS   
France    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
Germany**    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
Ghana    2000  1993  TRAINS   
Hong Kong    1998  1988  TRAINS   
Iceland    2001  1993  TRAINS   
India    1999  1990  TRAINS   
Indonesia    2000  1989  TRAINS   
Israel    2004  1993  TRAINS   
Italy    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
Japan    2000  1985  NAT  1988 
Korea, Rep.    1999  1985  NAT  1988 
Malaysia    2001  1988  TRAINS   
Mexico    2000  1985  NAT  1991 
Morocco    2000  1993  TRAINS   
Nepal    2000  1993  TRAINS   
Netherlands    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
New Zealand    2000  1992  TRAINS   
Pakistan    2001  1985  NAT  1995 
Paraguay    2000  1985  NAT  1991 
Peru    2000  1985  NAT  1993 
Philippines    2000  1985  NAT  1988 
Singapore    2001  1985  NAT  1989 
Spain    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
Sri Lanka    2000  1990  TRAINS   
Sweden    2000  1988  TRAINS   
Taiwan    2000  1985  NAT  1989 
Thailand    2000  1989  TRAINS     44 
Trinidad and Tobago    2001  1991  TRAINS   
Turkey    1999  1993  TRAINS   
United Kingdom    2000  1988  TRAINS-EU   
United States    2000  1989  TRAINS   
Uruguay    2000  1985  NAT  1992 
Venezuela    2000  1985  NAT  1992 
Notes: Source of MFN tariff data is TRAINS for the late benchmark, and ALADI, TRAINS, and National Sources in the early 
benchmark.  EU  tariff  data  is  disaggregated  by  product  at  a  greater  level  of  digits  in  TRAINS  than  trade  data. TRAINS  = 
UNCTAD-TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System). TRAINS-EU = The EU schedule of tariffs according to TRAINS. 
NAT = National sources. 
* Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as separate countries starting in 1999. Trade for both countries was queried separately 
and then aggregated for years 1998 and earlier. 
** East Germany (DDR) is excluded from Germany data for years 1990 and prior; BEC and SITC Rev.1 leaf-level data is not 
available for DDR. 